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MEET THE TROLLS

As hundreds of thousands of acknowledgments of the accuracy of 'Cracking the Code- The Fascinating Truth About Taxation In America' (CtC) by dozens of federal, state and local tax agencies grace mailboxes across the country this Spring, just as they have continuously since 2003, it shouldn't be necessary for me to write this commentary. But sadly, even despite the years and all those acknowledgments, a nest of specialists within the tax-beneficiary crowd persists in its long-running effort to slow or even stop the spread of the liberating truth about the income tax.

Like gnarly, evil-tempered little trolls lurking under cognitive cross-overs, these folks crank out blog and news-group posts, and even entire websites focused on undermining the CtC-educated community. All of these feverish efforts are richly salted with frustration and ire against those of us who have read the law for ourselves, found that it doesn't say what the hired help has been telling us it does, and have stood up and stepped off the Kool-Aid Express to ruin and despotism. Reading their stuff you can almost hear the gnashing of teeth and the mutters of, "What's with these people? Surely they don't take that hokey, "Land of the Free and Home of the Brave" stuff seriously?!"

Anyway, the frustration and ire are typically concealed behind an affected weariness: "Come now, folks, we've heard from the courts that this CtC-stuff is wrong..." Inevitably, though, the eye-rolling and snide sarcasms, or puffy announcements of what some court has done, never extend to analysis or argument about anything actually relevant to the tax, such as the Constitutional tax clauses or the definition of "capitation" or what the Supreme Court has said about both.

Instead, the trolls confine themselves to inventing and disposing of straw-man arguments, misrepresentations of either CtC or case-law (or both together), or simple, outright factual lies. The objective is always to distract, discourage and dissuade.

Happily, upon competent examination every mendacity cranked-out by troll-kind simply underscores the accuracy of CtC and the desperation of its enemies. So, while having to discuss this stuff is a chore, it is also a fruitful one from which we can all take intellectual and spiritual nourishment. We can also enjoy a little welcome entertainment watching the slinky trolls take their richly-deserved tumbles.

 

THE STRAW-MAN PLOYS

Trolls love “straw-men”! For instance, the trolls will archly quote snippets from a few federal court rulings which they hope will be taken as contradictory of something in CtC but which actually address something that never appears in the book. Presented as "rebuttals," these are really mere "straw-man" set-ups and knock-downs.

A typical example is an observation by a court that the income tax is not confined exclusively to "income of federal workers and office-holders," offered with a, "So, there!" as though CtC makes the specious argument to the contrary. But while many in the "tax honesty" movement HAVE made that specious argument, CtC does not. Thus, the only thing this observation contradicts is what the crooked and gnarly trolls misrepresent about the book, so as to pretend it contains assertions which they can dispute.

It is hoped the target of this stuff will not yet have actually read CtC, and so won't realize that what is being ascribed to it is false, and the "rebuttal" a mere pretense. It is also desperately hoped that those of you who ARE already familiar with CtC won't catch the REAL "Aha!" moment, which comes on recognizing that these straw-men are deployed because the trolls can't attack anything that really DOES appear in the book...

 

THE MISREPRESENTATIONS

In addition to cluttering the landscape with the bodies of straw-men, the troll community tries to sow confusion and doubt with portions of "case-law" taken out of context and otherwise misrepresented. Trolls will trot out excerpts of rulings capable of being misleading and misunderstood as to what they appear to say, which have been carefully selected after digging through thousands of tax-related cases that have been in the courts over the decades.

Frequently, the misleading strength of these excerpts is powerfully enhanced by the fact that they have been misused by the DOJ in other cases since first appearing.  This works like a game of telephone in which what REALLY got said in the original ruling becomes very distorted in the re-telling (although in this case by design).

The trolls are then able to cite the later ruling, which itself only cites to the original, perhaps with the excerpt, but without any clarifying context provided. The mantle of the later court’s authority appears to be thrown over the misrepresentation, and the victim of the troll’s effort to mislead is almost certain to never take the trouble of reading the original ruling to discover that the later court was actually itself misled by the DOJ attorneys, and really, NO court has actually said what the excerpt from the original case is misrepresented to suggest.

 The best and most heavily exploited examples of such judicial misrepresentations include-- no pun intended-- excerpted language concerning the scope of the term "employee" and the effect of the term "includes" on that scope which were issued a quarter of a century ago in the cases of United States v. Latham, 754 F.2d 747 (7th Cir. 1985) and Sullivan v. United States, 788 F.2d 813 (1st Cir. 1986).

Both rulings are used to fraudulently suggest that these two circuit courts have held that the custom definition of the term "employee" appearing in 26 USC § 3401(c) embraces anyone and everyone who would meet a common dictionary definition of 'employee'. Actually, neither court made a holding on the subject at all, and all that either of them really said in regard to the subject was that the term "employee" in chapter 24 of the IRC doesn't exclude every worker not explicitly listed in its custom statutory definition-- an entirely different thing from all-inclusiveness, as shall be shown.

The Latham court starts its drive-by on this subject with, "[An argument] that under 26 USC § 3401(c) the category of ‘employee’ does not include privately employed wage earners is a preposterous reading of the statute”. This is the only part of the ruling that is ever presented by the government in a brief, and is intended to be taken as a conclusory declaration that "employee" in § 3401(c) is all-inclusive of all workers. But even leaving aside the use in this statement of "wages", itself a custom-defined term in the law meaning remuneration paid to § 3401(c) "employees", which makes the statement appear to be an inane tautology, the court actually goes on to clarify its confused snarkiness with, "[T]he reference to certain entities or categories [in the "employee" definition] is not intended to exclude all others".

Thus, when speaking more thoughtfully and comprehensibly, the court makes carefully clear that it is actually saying NOT that "employee" is "all-inclusive" of all workers, which, of course, would be absurd. If this were true, “employee” WOULDN'T HAVE a special definition provided in the law itself, as any freshman law school student understands. Nor would "federal employees" be specifically listed in that special definition, as, in fact, they are and always have been-- after all, why list them if the term includes ALL workers?

Instead, the court's declaration-- in its entirety, rather than just the context-less snippet mis-used by the DOJ-- explicitly and carefully AVOIDS saying these things. All it carefully says is that the list of examples defining the class "employee" is not a comprehensive list of all the workers who qualify for this class.

Needless to say, no CtC-educated person would argue with this observation. After all, the definition of “employee” deploys the term "includes”. That term has its OWN special meaning, provided in the IRC (at 26 USC § 7701(c)), and explained by the Treasury Department (at 27 CFR § 72.11) as: “The terms “includes and including” do not exclude things not enumerated which are in the same general class.”  This rule of construction allows the "employee" definition to embrace other workers not explicitly named in the enumeration but who share the distinguishing common characteristics of those who are-- all of which are federally-connected workers of one kind or another. Thus, the term "employee" in chapter 24 covers not just the federally-connected workers listed, but also other federally-connected workers who, though not listed, are nonetheless within the same general class.

The Sullivan ruling-- both as falsely represented and in what is actually said-- is of the same character as Latham’s. It is just simpler to parse, since the very portion of the ruling excerpted and deployed by the DOJ to falsely suggest that the court held that "employee" is all inclusive contains its own clarification:

“To the extent Sullivan argues that he received no ‘wages’ because he was not an ‘employee’ within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 3401(c), that contention is meritless.  Section § 3401(c), which relates to income tax withholding, indicates that the definition of ‘employee’ includes government officers and employees, elected officials, and corporate officers.  The statute does not purport to limit withholding to the persons listed therein."

As is the case in Latham, even on its face this excerpt says nothing of any significance.  Saying that, "The statute does not purport to limit withholding to the persons listed therein," is in no way the same as saying that "Withholding applies to everybody, period," although this is how the tax agencies would like this language to be understood.  In fact, "The statute does not purport to limit withholding to the persons listed therein," is language which explicitly and carefully AVOIDS saying: "Withholding applies to everybody, period."

So, there's certainly nothing controversial or disputatious of CtC in what these rulings ACTUALLY say. But the reason they are trotted out by the troll community is its expectation that the observations by these courts that the "employee" definitional list is not EXCLUSIVE will be misunderstood by the reader as saying that the definitional list is ALL-INCLUSIVE (and that therefore remuneration to all workers is taxable "wages")! Perhaps professional liars rely on the sheer audacity of their BS to blunt the critical thinking skills of their targets...

The hope that these rulings will be misunderstood rests on the fact that in each case the court casually and somewhat sarcastically disparages the contentions related to the term "employee" made by Latham and Sullivan: Latham's that his jury should have been instructed that he was not an "employee" because he is not described in the enumerated list in the definition of that term in chapter 24; and Sullivan's that his claim of receiving no "wages" is not frivolous for essentially the same reason.  The disparagement of these positions in the trolls' out-of-context excerpts makes it appear the courts are ruling that Latham and Sullivan DID qualify as "employees" relevant to the statute. But this would be a misunderstanding, just like mistaking "not exclusive" as meaning "all-inclusive."

In fact, the question of whether Latham and Sullivan qualified as "employees" was never actually before, or considered by, either court.

As it happens, both Latham and Sullivan had failed to dispute testimony that each had received the sort of "wages" which are paid to "employees," and thus each had compromised his own argument. Both left W-2s declaring payments to them of "wages" unrebutted. Sullivan actually attaches them to his return while declaring on the 1040 that he had received $0 "wages"; while Latham didn't file at all.

Thus, both courts do nothing more than dismiss Latham and Sullivan's specific and very limited-meaning appeal arguments. The Latham court declines to declare what little it says about "employees" to be a holding in the case; and the Sullivan court declares outirght that the only issues it intends to resolve in the case are whether Sullivan's filing (which was quite unconventional) was a "return" and whether it was "frivolous." (Yes, and definitely yes.)

In any event, even in their sarcastic dicta, both the Latham and Sullivan courts carefully avoid declaring that the statutory term "employee" is all-inclusive, or embraces all commonly-defined employees (as they would have if that's actually what they actually meant). A superficial reading can leave a mistaken impression to the contrary, and that's why these two 25-year-old excerpts are trotted-out. Their confusing language and its misrepresentation has fooled a lot of folks over the years.

Don't YOU be fooled, and don't let anyone else be fooled, either.

In the law, precision matters. As a famous liar once explained in arguing that what everyone THINKS happened really didn't, legally speaking: "It depends on what the meaning of "is" is..."

More importantly, don't miss, or let anyone else miss, the REAL message of the resort to "misunderstandable" excerpts such as these: There ARE no rulings actually saying that "employee" in chapter 24 of the IRC embraces everyone who might be defined as an employee under the common meaning of the word. (Nor do any say that the pay of everyone who might be defined as an employee under the common meaning of the word is "wages" as that term is meant in the tax law.)

NONE.

Misrepresentation of Latham and Sullivan IS THE BEST THE DISSEMBLERS HAVE GOT. That’s why they are used.

(On the other hand, there ARE cases which explicitly say that "employee" IS NOT all-inclusive, such as United States v. Bass, 784 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1986). Here, the meaning of "employee" WAS considered, in a two-and-a-half page detailed analysis. Bass's conviction was overturned explicitly because the trial judge had done just what the trolls want you to think the Latham and Sullivan courts say is correct: he instructed Bass's jury that Bass qualified as an "employee" relevant to chapter 24 of the IRC just because he was a commonly-defined employee...

Bass never disputed being a commonly-defined employee; he simply argued that he was not a statutorily-defined "employee," and said that whether he qualified as the latter was a matter for the government to try to prove and his jury to decide. The 5th circuit said, "You betcha'!" and reversed Bass's nine-count conviction. Somehow the trolls manage to overlook cases like Bass.

Anyway, see this for a detailed discussion of Latham and Sullivan and the misuse of these rulings by government law-defiers... and see this document for a complete presentation on how the courts REALLY construe "includes".)

 

THE BLATANT HARD-FACT LIES

In addition to the straw-man arguments, and deliberate misrepresentations of the sort just discussed, efforts to keep Americans from learning just how they're being screwed by what we ludicrously still call our "public servants" also involve outright, sometimes astonishingly blatant hard-fact lies. Here is a great, multi-level example, which was just shown to me by a Warrior for the truth and the rule of law who, to my great and enduring appreciation, devotes time and energy (and clear thinking) to the satisfying and important chore of debunking troll-tripe at every opportunity:

"[I]n denying [Hendrickson's] post-trial motion for a new trial (or acquittal) and rejecting his challenges to the instructions given to the jury on the meanings of "wages" and "employee," the court stated that Hendrickson "was not entitled to jury instructions reflecting his own views as to the purported meanings of the terms 'wages' and 'employee' under the Internal Revenue Code" because "the courts have uniformly held that the ordinary remuneration received by privately employed workers qualifies as taxable 'wages' under the Internal Revenue Code." The court also pointed out that the judgment against Hendrickson in the erroneous refund suit was an "explicit rejection" of his position."

As my 15-year-old, T[homas] J[efferson], would say, "WOW!"

I say, "Where to begin..." (Imagine my hands rubbing together in anticipation.)

Well, let's start with the first dodge. The trolls say, "the court stated that Hendrickson..." Right off the bat, then, we have a little fallacy-- an "argument from authority." The reader is invited to imagine that whatever follows should be taken to be true in its particulars because the court said it.

At the same time, the troll who makes this post (and who has to be concerned that his real identity and affiliation might be discovered) avoids taking responsibility for any of the particular assertions that follow. There is good reason for this, for each and every one of them is a falsehood.

For instance, the trollpost quotes "the court" as saying, "[I] was not entitled to jury instructions reflecting [my] own views as to the purported meanings of the terms 'wages' and 'employee'..." Who could disagree? It wouldn't be me!

I never ASKED that my jury be given "my views." I said the jury should deliberate based on the verbatim statutory definitions of these terms. The jurors asked for those, also. But the court refused to let the jury see what how Congress actually defines the terms "wages" and "employee" for purposes of the law involved in the case.

Instead, bowing to a government request, the court ordered the jury to deliberate using prosecution-written "interpretations" of the statutory definitions! So, directly contrary to the mendacious nonsense offered up here, it was THE GOVERNMENT that asked for jury instructions reflecting a custom "view" as to the purported meanings of the terms "wages" and "employees"-- and that's ALL "the court" let the jury see! Thus, the falsehood in this statement by "the court" (and the trolls who present it) is worthy of Wonderland itself. (It was not idly that I used that theme in CtC...) See the trial transcripts documenting all that I am saying about this in the discussion here.

Next we have the REASON given for why I wasn't entitled to have my jury see the actual words of Congress in the statutes (which clearly show that "wages" are a specialized type of remuneration, which is why the government insisted that my jury not see them): [B]ecause "the courts have uniformly held that the ordinary remuneration received by privately employed workers qualifies as taxable 'wages' under the Internal Revenue Code.""

Well, actually, no, they haven’t.

No court has EVER said this.

THIS court won’t even say it, you’ll notice…

Instead, it just plays this cheap game of “Whack-a-Mole”, making an assertion as to what “the [other] courts” have supposedly said. Well, guess which rulings are cited for this supposed proposition which “the courts have uniformly held”? The 25-year-old Latham and Sullivan rulings!

It is only these two old rulings, from which misleading excerpts can be conveniently extracted, that are cited as authority for this assertion about "ordinary remuneration" being "taxable "wages"" that neither of them actually say, as we discovered previously. It is only these rulings that the DOJ cites for this bogus assertion in its request that the jury be instructed to this effect while being denied sight of the actual statutory language.

Wouldn't you think that if "the courts have uniformly held" what Judge Rosen says they have, he or the DOJ could have come up with at least ONE ruling that actually DOES say it, instead of having to resort to these quarter-century old bits of misleading dicta that DON'T actually say it (and are from other circuits, to boot)...?

Once again, the fact is no court has EVER said what Judge Rosen and the trolls pretend that Latham and Sullivan say. Judge Rosen's and the DOJ's failure to come up with even one which DOES say this, and their being forced to resort to the hoary Latham and Sullivan misrepresentations instead, is as pithy an evidence of this as one could hope for. But these folks figure they don't have to worry about that too much. They're confident that the sheep targeted by this kind of BS will take them at their word without personal investigation, 'cause they're, you know, "officials"...

(Nor WILL any court say what Judge Rosen suggests "the courts" have "uniformly held." To treat ordinary remuneration received by privately-employed workers as federally taxable simply as such, would be to impose a capitation, which, without apportionment, would be illegal.)

 

THE SPIN

What's left is the last line of this paragraph of "official" obfuscation, and what really prompted this commentary. That line refers to Judge Rosen "pointing out that the judgment against Hendrickson in the erroneous refund suit [against him and his wife Doreen] was an "explicit rejection" of his position."

There are two things lurking in this sentence, each of which is an invitation to the reader to surrender to a lie. The first is the assertion that “the judgment against Hendrickson in the erroneous refund suit was an "explicit rejection"...”

You'd think from this assertion that in one of the two rulings at the district court level in that suit, or in what was issued by the appellate court, a judge MUST have finally said what Judge Rosen declares that "the courts uniformly hold.".. After all, this was a suit directly designed and brought for the purpose of discouraging Americans from reading CtC.

This WOULD be the time and the occasion, don't you think?

That MUST be what happened, right?

WRONG. No judge ever says it; not even the DOJ dares to say such a ridiculous thing, even once, in all its hundreds of pages of briefs and declarations of IRS agents filed in the suit.

Instead, under the bizarre pretense that we never contested them, District Court Judge Nancy Edmunds simply adopted DOJ-written "findings" that whatever was asserted on W-2s and 1099s issued by payers for the two years involved was "fact." Judge Edmunds let slip into the record of a proceeding 3 years later that she had done so based on misconstruing our sworn disputes of the W-2 and 1099 assertions to actually be endorsements of those assertions.

(At the same time, though, Edmunds ordered Doreen and me to rescind our disputations, execute ACTUAL endorsements of those assertions, and swear these dictated declarations to be our own freely-made testimony. This command makes clear that the pretense of her alleged construction of our disputations as somehow being endorsements was just that, a fraudulent pretense... Needless to say, we have never complied with this grossly illegal order.

Furthermore, the ruling of which these orders are a part is based on fraud. For instance, the DOJ accompanied its Motion for Summary Judgment with a purported "Tax Examination" on which numbers of "tax owed" appear to have been calculated. These numbers were explicitly adopted by Judge Edmunds as "facts", on the finding of which she based her conclusions and issued her ruling. However, when carefully read it turns out that the "Examiner's" report contains the following admission:

 

"The preparation of this report DID NOT constitute a formal audit or examination..." SAY WHAT??!!

Think about it. This is a lawsuit brought by the United States, alleging outstanding liabilities and asking for a never-before-sought-or-granted-in American-history order seizing control of the speech and sworn testimony of two American citizens-- not to mention a lawsuit against Pete Hendrickson (and his wife Doreen), in regard to whom the IRS likely maintains a dedicated division.

 The suit is brought in the hope of turning back the swelling tide of CtC-educated filings, and is an escalated government effort after years of failed previous attempts. NONETHELESS, THE GOVERNMENT CAN'T CONTRADICT WHAT IS TAUGHT IN CtC AND PRODUCE A FORMAL EXAMINATION ON WHICH TO BASE ITS ALLEGATIONS. It's hard to imagine a more definitive acknowledgement of the accuracy and unassailability of the book all this is meant to discourage Americans from reading.

Similarly, a declaration was submitted by a "frivolous return specialist", who reports on the great number of returns identical to ours the IRS had been having to deal with since CtC went to print-- but never actually declares such returns to be frivolous, and in particular says no such thing about OUR returns. (See the relevant portions of this declaration here, and an analysis filed in response (even though the submission by the government of both declarations-- and the Motion for Summary Judgment in support of which they were supposedly offered-- were all untimely and inappropriate, since we had a Motion to Dismiss on jurisdictional grounds still pending before the court) here.)

The patently bogus "findings of fact" by Judge Edmunds were then used as the basis for all decisions made in this farce of a "legal proceeding," in which never so much as a single hearing was held. Those decisions were upheld on the same basis in an appellate ruling. See transcripts and other documentation of falsehoods deployed by the DOJ and adopted by Judge Edmunds and the appellate court here.

Significantly, the circuit court refused to publish its decision in this case even after being asked to do so by the DOJ. This means that rather than being merely deemed UNRELIABLE and therefore denied precedential standing (due to being a hasty, off-hand and therefore possibly legally unsound decision), THIS appellate decision is KNOWN to be legally unsound and unharmonious with valid precedential "case-law."

So, "the judgment in the erroneous refund suit" is NOT an "explicit rejection" of my "position." On the contrary, it is nearly the exact opposite: a scramble by both the district and appellate courts to EVADE "my position," which required a systematic and possibly unprecedented due process violation of massive gravity, along with an admittedly invalid appellate "ruling."

But of course you're supposed to INFER the "rejection" that no one can bring him or herself to articulate, based on the fact that instead of dismissing the government's suit, a corrupt court and DOJ to manage to contrive a series of pretexts and due process violations by which to sustain it and ultimately declare a ruling in the government's favor...

The final lie oozing poison in this paragraph of mendacity is the characterization of what is taught in CtC as "a position." The effort here is to suggest to the unknowing that what CtC presents is some kind of theory, or, more closely put, an ideological or personally-pleasing opinion, like a policy stance: "It is my position, harrumph, harrumph, that children are to be seen and not heard!"

"It is my position that we ought to use more nuclear power."

"It is my position that... Well, it's my position that the income tax ought to be administered in strict conformity to the relevant statutes, with no effort to exploit anyone's ignorance of those statutes..."

CtC is no more a matter of "position" than was the matter of whether the Earth orbits the Sun or the other way 'round back in the day, even though Galileo found that authority-figures of his time chose to argue with him. Those authorities ultimately did everything they could to suppress the facts and reasoning that proved that Galileo WASN'T promoting a "POSITION" but was simply making an demonstrably true observation about reality. Likewise now, with "official" efforts to suppress what is revealed in CtC...

Demonstrably true observations about reality is all CtC involves, as well. As I said at the beginning of this article, what follows shouldn't need to be repeated. It's all been laid out before.

But, like rust, the morally corrupt, and the poison of the lies they sow, never sleep, and so neither can those of us on the side of the truth, and the liberty for which the truth is the only real foundation.

 

WHY ALL THE TROLL-WORK IS FUTILE

The following are simple observations of reality and an application of the most humble logic:

  • That any tax on (or measured by) common economic activity (or the proceeds therefrom) is a capitation as that term is meant in the United States Constitution is a DEMONSTRABLE FACT, not a "position."
  • That a federal capitation is only legal if laid by means of apportionment is a DEMONSTRABLE FACT, not a "position."
  • That the apportionment requirement on a federal capitation or other direct tax was not changed by the 16th Amendment is a DEMONSTRABLE FACT, not a "position." Therefore,
  • That any economic activity upon which an unapportioned federal tax is laid or measured MUST be NOT common, and NOT something that can be done as a matter of right is a DEMONSTRABLE FACT, not a "position," and therefore,
  • That the object of an unapportioned federal tax MUST involve the exercise of privilege is a DEMONSTRABLE FACT, not a "position."

Finally, in light of all the foregoing,

  • That "income" as that term is used in the tax laws means, and has always meant only privilege-connected economic activity is axiomatic, and thus a DEMONSTRABLE FACT, not a "position."

If you aren't already familiar with the proofs related to these statements and conclusions, click here.

 

STRAW-MEN, MISREPRESENTATIONS, HARD-FACT LIES AND SPIN, REDOUX

You'll recall my mentioning at the beginning that the trolls carefully avoid the subjects of capitations, the Constitution, and anything else fundamental to the tax. The reasons should be obvious. As the Supreme Court has observed,

“It is elementary law that every statute is to be read in the light of the constitution. However broad and general its language, it cannot be interpreted as extending beyond those matters which it was within the constitutional power of the legislature to reach.”

McCullough v. Com. of Virginia, 172 U.S. 102 (1898)

The last thing the trolls want is attention drawn to the issue of the Constitutional power of the legislature, which includes the limits on that grant of power. Instead, they do everything they can to seduce anyone listening into imagining that the nature of the tax hinges on technicalities, or that it is to be learned from obscure court decisions presented without context. The trolls hope that you will not read more than what they show you, and do only a quick and thought-free reading of even just that.

For instance, I have actually seen attacks on CtC in which it is implied that the book argues that it is the statutory limits on the classes identified in various definitions that generates the limits on the tax itself! The trolls ascribe to CtC the specious argument that because the definitions of "employee," "employment," "wages," "trade or business" are inherently limited in the statutes, thus the tax is limited!

This would put the matter backward, of course, with the tail wagging the dog. It is BECAUSE the tax is limited-- and Constitutionally must be – that terms like "employee" and "employment" which control what qualifies as "wages" subject to reporting requirements and the tax, and to withholding under the protocols of chapter 24 of the IRC, are NOT all-inclusive of anyone who works for anyone else, but instead embrace only federally-connected classes of workers.

Indeed, the limitations on the class "employee" in chapter 24, "employment" in chapter 21 and "trade or business" in chapter 79 of the IRC are simply statutory-structural acknowledgments of the overriding and elsewhere limited character of the tax. They are what they are in order to conform to the larger realities concerning the tax.

This effort to suggest that the meaning of "includes" is the linchpin of CtC's revelations about the tax hopes to leverage IRS-cultivated confusion about that term into debilitating confusion about the tax overall. It's also intended to slyly promote the misunderstanding that what can and can't be taxed as "income" (that is, without apportionment) is a matter of statute – entirely within Congressional authority, and without any Constitutional dimension. It is an effort to dodge what CtC REALLY teaches, and keep the casual observer from learning what REALLY dictates the limits on the tax.

At the same time, even while trying to focus attention on "includes," trolldom won't discuss the actual jurisprudence (or even standard rules of English language) concerning the meaning of that term for purposes of the income tax. Things like the Latham and Sullivan gimmicks are all an unwitting victim of trollish mendacity will ever see on the subject. Getting one's information solely from the trolls, one would think that the courts have never actually taken up the matter of whether "includes" mean "all-inclusive," or "not exclusive," or "also includes," or what.

This is not so, of course. The Supreme Court has ruled very explicitly on the subject, and repeatedly.

The court holds that as used in tax law, "includes" denotes that the enumerated list of objects that follows it in a definition is an illustrative sampling of a unique CLASS being defined, which will bear the label that precedes "includes" (e.g., "employee"; "wages"; "trade or business"). In concert with the court's equally well-settled (and axiomatic) doctrine that a term given a special definition in a law has its common meaning stripped away, this makes any statutorily-defined term in tax law a unique term.

The meaning of such custom-defined terms is illustrated by the characteristic(s) common to each of the enumerated objects listed in the definition (which characteristic(s) can't be such as would make the term being defined have merely its common meaning, of course, since then no custom-definition would be needed or provided). The term can be construed to embrace objects which are not listed but which share class-definitional characteristic(s) of those which are (making it a term of "limited enlargement").

But you'll never see or hear a single acknowledgement from a troll of the existence of the many rulings concerning this issue. They don't dare raise them, because they can't argue against them.

Instead, they simply try to act as if they're hard-of-hearing when these rulings are brought up. In several of my motions to Judge Rosen, I lay out this thorough jurisprudence from the Supreme Court, as well as rulings to the same effect from the circuit courts (including recent rulings from the Sixth Circuit, the one in which Judge Rosen sits). In each case, even though writing lengthy rulings and decisions in (theoretical) response to my arguments, Judge Rosen has contrived to mention NOT ONE WORD concerning this jurisprudence.

Judge Rosen simply acts like this dispositive jurisprudence, which lays down precedent and doctrine by which he is bound, never appeared in my brief; and as though he is personally ignorant of this well-settled, elementary law. The same is true of all DOJ filings – both their briefs and motions and their responses to mine.

Don't misunderstand this point. It is not that the judge or DOJ attorneys dispute the arguments, or the authorities, or the aptness of the presentation of any one, or all of them. They just pretend not to have seen them at all. In the case of the judge's doing so when ruling on a legal argument, is a fundamental due process violation, as well as an effective admission that the evaded arguments prove the contrary ruling to be invalid.

In addition to judicial dodges of this sort there are even more extreme offenses from the courtroom. Occasionally, a court will simply say or imply something flatly untrue which offers support for the broad misrepresentations about the tax peddled by the revenue-and-power-hungry trollish community.

For instance, there is a 1984 ruling from the 5th Circuit in the case of Parker v. Comm'r, 724 F.2d 469, in which the court makes what is clearly meant to be taken as a declaration that the Supreme Court announced the 16th Amendment to have authorized a non-apportioned direct tax in its Brushaber decision! But the fact is, even though in the years since it was vomited forth, this ruling has been widely cited as authority for this bogus proposition, when the Parker opinion is read carefully, it turns out that this is NOT what it says.

Instead, although done in a way almost certain to be mistaken as a broad statement about capitations and other direct taxes, the Parker ruling says only that, "The Supreme Court promptly determined in Brushaber v. Union Pacific Ry. (sic) Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916), that the sixteenth amendment provided the needed constitutional basis for the imposition of a direct non-apportioned income tax." This language DOES NOT say "non-apportioned direct tax." It says "direct non-apportioned INCOME TAX." It is simply MISREAD as saying the former due to the inclusion of the word "direct"-- an inclusion that strongly suggests a deliberate intent to deceive.

As in the Latham and Sullivan misrepresentations, in which the reader is encouraged to imagine that even though carefully only saying "not exclusive," the courts should be understood as meaning "all inclusive," the language in Parker begs the reader to assume into evidence what actually doesn't appear. In this case what is hoped will be assumed is that "income" as used in this ruling means "all that comes in." Were this true, the Parker court would be saying that the 16th Amendment removed the apportionment requirement for federal capitations-- and it's in the hope that you'll imagine this to be the case that the Parker ruling is cited.

It is hoped that it will be overlooked that if that REALLY WERE what the court meant to say, the word "income" wouldn't appear in this declaration at all. Instead, the court would have said just what the reader is invited to assume it meant: "The Brushaber court declared that the 16th Amendment did away with the apportionment requirement for the imposition of direct taxes" (or, if one wishes to respect the distinction between static wealth and the accession of gains, "The Brushaber court declared that the 16th Amendment did away with the apportionment requirement for the imposition of capitations").

Most careless readers WILL make just that assumption, of course. Just as in the case of the "includes" dodge, the obfuscation constructed by the Parker court (and its deployment in DOJ frauds and judicial disgraces ever since) leverages the existing and long-cultivated lie that "income" as used in the tax laws DOES mean "all that comes in." With that misunderstanding being inserted into the Parker declaration, that language is mistakenly read as ."..a constitutional basis for the imposition of a direct non-apportioned "all that comes in" tax."

Plainly (to an HONEST and EDUCATED observer), this couldn't be more wrong. Such a tax would be a "direct, non-apportioned capitation"-- PRECISELY what the Supreme Court EXPLICITLY says the 16th DID NOT do, both in its ruling in Brushaber, where it points out that to read the amendment in that confused fashion would be to cause two Constitutional provisions to come into conflict with each other, and in its many other rulings on the same subject. Further, we hardly need the Supreme Court to point this out-- the 16th Amendment is short and to the point, and the word "repeal" doesn't appear in it.

But, because most careless readers (and corrupt courts and prosecutors) WILL fill in the needed misconception, the 5th circuit panel manages to furnish the government with a highly misleading ruling which will serve as a weapon against ignorant defendants in future cases. And which also, of course, will be trotted out by trolls in posts striving to turn back the CtC tide.

Ironically, what REALLY is to be taken from the Parker language is just what it plainly acknowledges when it is read without the distorting lens of conditioning-induced presumptions: The 16th Amendment DID NOT do away with the apportionment requirement for capitations-- that is,

  • taxes on "all that comes in";
  • taxes on every different species of revenue";
  • taxes on "the fortune or revenue of each contributor";
  • taxes on the [common-meaning] wages of labour";
  • taxes on "what is supposed to be one's fortune [per] an assessment which varies from year to year"; or
  • taxes on "[an assessment of a percentage] of [one's] supposed [commonly-defined] income");
  • or for any other direct tax.

If the 16th HAD done this, the Parker court would not have carefully included the term "income" in its declaration. At the same time, since the amendment DID undo the Pollock court's application of apportionment to "incomes" (as the Parker ruling is careful to specify), it is clear that the two things ("incomes" as relevant to the tax, and the "all that comes in," etc., that is relevant to capitations) are two DIFFERENT things.

In short, the Parker court, in dancing its little dance in the Parker ruling, acknowledged that what CtC teaches about the tax is PRECISELY CORRECT.

By the way, even the careful, circumscribed language of the Parker ruling gets the 16th Amendment and the Brushaber court discussion thereof wrong. As has already been pointed out, the Brushaber court DOESN'T say (or indicate) that the amendment authorizes a "direct non-apportioned income tax." What the amendment does, and what the Brushaber court says it does, is prevent the application of the income tax – which is, and always has been inherently an indirect excise (because of its incidence on nothing but the exercise of privilege) – from being construed to be a direct tax when applied to dividends and rent by the reasoning used in the Pollock decision. (See Part II of ‘A Brief Introduction To The Fascinating Truth About The Income Tax’ for a much more comprehensive discussion of why some courts misleadingly throw the word “direct” into references to the “income tax”.)

But that's not all! This is a bogus, contrived ruling that gives and gives...

The Parker court makes several other glaring mis-statements about the tax. For instance, it disparages Parker's citation of Flint v. Stone Tracy in regard to the character of the tax as an excise, with what is meant to be the withering observation that Flint predates the 16th Amendment, and that it concerns "corporate taxation," rather than "the personal income tax":

"Appellant cites Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911), in support of his contention that the income tax is an excise tax applicable only against special privileges, such as the privilege of conducting a business, and is not assessable against income in general. Appellant twice errs. Flint did not address personal income tax; it was concerned with corporate taxation. Furthermore, Flint is pre-sixteenth amendment and must be read in that light."

 

WOW! Such pomposity, especially when either being outright disingenuous or just getting it wrong out of ignorance!

One question immediately arises, of course: If the distinction the court means to be taken between "corporate taxation" and "personal income tax" is valid, what would the timing of Flint (pre- or post-16th) have to do with anything?  Each of these two assertions make the other irrelevant – presented together they are evidence that what is being said is not understood by the speaker himself, or is just pure eyewash. From that alone, both can be dismissed as the shiny BS that they are.

Furthermore, the gist of each of the court's assertions are flatly wrong by themselves.

We have already looked in detail at the enormous body of evidence concerning the fact that pre-sixteenth/post-sixteenth is a distinction without a difference. As for the alleged distinction between "corporate taxation" and "the personal income tax," there is none there, either. Corporations are taxed only on their "income" that is taxed under the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909 (which is what Flint addressed), just as are persons under the "personal income tax." And "income" is "income."

"Income" is a Constitutional term, and prior to the 16th Amendment had already been firmly established in meaning by extensive statutory usage, and a series of court rulings as well. That there is no difference between what is taxed as "income" to corporations and what is taxed as "income" to other persons should be clear from the fact that both the Corporate Excise Tax and the various other "income" tax enactments from 1862 to the present are all intermingled in Title 26, the "Internal Revenue" title, with no distinctions drawn regarding what qualifies as "income" amongst any subject of the tax.

Further, this very point has been directly addressed by the Supreme Court. See, for instance, Southern Pacific v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330 (1918): "Certainly the term "income" has no broader meaning in the 1913 Act [the first post 16th amendment "income" tax enactment] than in that of 1909..." See Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170 (1926), for another dose of the same: ""Income" has been taken to mean the same thing as used in the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, in the 16th Amendment and in the various revenue acts subsequently passed."

You'd think the Parker judges would know these things, wouldn't you...  Staying on top of this stuff would help keep them from twice erring (plus, isn't keeping sharp on this sort of thing an important part of their job?).

Sadly, it's very hard to believe this stuff is a mystery to the 5th Circuit. Thus, one can't help but suspect something more nefarious than mere arrogance and ignorance.

In fact, it is almost certain that the court is simply exploiting a poor choice of wording by Parker. The court claims that Parker argued that the tax is not assessable against income in general – an obvious misstatement if indeed this is the wording Parker used.

Also, it is implied in the panel's sarcastic response that Parker narrowly argued the tax as "applicable only against special privileges, such as the privilege of conducting a business," rather than arguing from a comprehensive, fully-educated understanding of what comprises "privilege" relevant to the tax. Thus, however specious the justifications given for doing so, the court may simply be capitalizing on Parker's poor arguments.

There is no question that for the most part, Parker was a deer-in-the-headlights litigant, however well-intentioned and motivated he may have been to begin with. He had brought suit challenging IRS deduction calculations and a penalty for failure-to-file, concerning a return and an amended return for 1977 which contained no numbers, just citing the 5th Amendment instead.

Along with private-sector pay and other receipts during the year, Parker had received an Air Force pension (accurately described by the court as "taxable pension income"). In trial, Parker adopted government assertions that all of his receipts were income, according to the appellate panel. The only things actually being litigated in the case were the propriety of the penalty, and IRS calculations concerning the deductability of rental loss and medical expenses.

So, not only does this ruling NOT say what it is hoped you will think it does, just like Latham and Sullivan, but this case was not at all about whether or not the 16th provided for a direct tax, whether the tax is an excise, or what that means, or anything else concerned with these declarations by the court, just as Latham and Sullivan were not about the meaning of "employee." Parker himself had declared all his receipts to be "income," even though he almost certainly did not understand the significance of doing so.

Nonetheless, just as Latham and Sullivan have been being deployed for decades by corrupt agencies to mislead the naive about the meaning of "employee" and "includes," so Parker has become a workhorse of mendacity.

In fact, the bogus language in Parker is not only used to reach bad conclusions in other cases, it actually performs the "garbage in" office on a Wikipedia page purporting to "debunk tax protestor arguments." The page, furnished and kept up by the usual IRS shills and fellow-travelers, deploys an excerpt from a 7th Circuit case – Lovell v. United States, 755 F.2d 517 (1984), in which the Lovell court declares, "Plaintiffs also contend that the Constitution prohibits imposition of a direct tax without apportionment. They are wrong; it does not. U.S. Const. amend. XVI." The authority cited for this bogus assertion? The Parker ruling! For more on this, click here.

 

Regarding Trolleries, Part 1