The Issue Of Kamala Harris's Eligibility For Office

"No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President..."

Article II, Section I, Clause V of the United States Constitution

I'VE RECENTLY SEEN CLAIMS that Kamala Harris, while born in the USA, is the child of non-citizens in America merely on student visas. If so, then she is not qualified to be vice-president, or even senator, for that matter.

We'll begin with an analysis of the "birthright citizenship" notion itself. Then we'll apply what has been shown to the specifics of Kamala Harris' birth circumstances.

A CHILD OF NON-CITIZEN PARENTS does not acquire citizenship simply by being born on American soil-- myths about so-called "birthright citizenship" notwithstanding. The law on this is perfectly clear and unambiguous, and the pretense to the contrary relies entirely upon the glossing-over of inconvenient and contradictory words in the Fourteenth Amendment.

In this case, the phrase "or naturalized" is the one conveniently disregarded, as though its presence has no impact on the meaning of the citizenship clause. But that phrase-- which translates as, "or granted citizenship"-- is actually the key to the meaning of the clause (or, at least, the key to untangling misrepresentation or misunderstanding of the clause).

Here is the complete language of the amendment, in relevant part:

"Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside."

So, let's insert the translation of "naturalized", which will make immediately obvious that this amendment clause is not intended to grant citizenship to anyone in any normal sense of the term:

"All persons born or granted citizenship in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside."

Obviously this language contemplates and concerns persons already possessed of citizenship by normal procedures-- either through birth to citizen parents, or having been granted it through naturalization.

As this more complete rendering of the language helps clarify, the purpose of the provision is not the granting of United States citizenship. Instead its purpose is the granting of state citizenship to those who are already United States citizens.

A LOOK AT THE 14th AMENDMENT'S CONTEXT AND HISTORY makes this yet more clear, revealing that those for whom this clause was designed are the persons naturalized by the Civil Rights Act of 1866. That group consists of former slaves, all of whom, if having been born in the United States, are granted United States citizenship thereby:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.

Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State or Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by this act, or to different punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such person having at any time been held in a condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, or by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of white persons, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the court.

Civil Rights Act of 1866, first two sections (emphasis added)

Note that the overall language of the enactment plainly has as its object only those persons born into slavery, and now freed. Harmoniously, the specific language refers to all persons born in the United States-- while making no reference or provisions regarding persons who shall be born in the United States (none of whom could then be born into slavery, the institution having at that point been abolished).

Further, expressly EXCLUDED from the group with which the act is concerned is anyone "subject to any foreign power". This includes anyone born with allegiance to any other country by virtue of his or her parents' foreign citizenship-- such as every baby that is the object of today's "birthright citizenship" misunderstanding.

("Subject to the jurisdiction thereof" is the 14th Amendment's restatement by other words of the Civil Rights Act's earlier phrase, "not subject to any foreign power". It was perhaps restated thusly in order to pre-empt exceptions based on a claimant's argument that his parents are somehow not foreign allegiant. Per the new version of the language in the 14th Amendment, that negative, even if true, wouldn't be good enough to allow a slip under the wire.)

THE REASON FOR THE 14th AMENDMENT "CITIZENSHIP" PROVISION, very briefly, is that after the slave population was emancipated following the War to Suppress Southern Independence, many states (North and South) refused to treat freed slaves as citizens. The refusal found expression particularly in the denial of voting rights.

This denial of voting rights to the freed slaves created a conundrum for the North. The Northern state bloc faced the prospect of increased Southern strength in Congress due to the entire former slave population now being counted in full (rather than at 3/5 each) for purposes of determining the number of representatives in each state's delegation. But with the freed slaves unable to vote, the interests represented by the stronger Southern delegations would likely remain just as hostile to the Northern agenda as ever they had been, simply with more power in their hands.

The solution was the 14th Amendment, compelling every state to treat all United States citizens living within their borders as citizens of the states, as well. The expectation was that this compelled citizenship would convey unabridged voting rights.

Even so, the optimistic expectation of proper state behavior was back-stopped. Recognizing that even state citizenship might not be enough to safeguard the Northern purpose against the acts of what are, after all, sovereign states (and were still thought of in that way, at that point), the following fail-safe language-- which nicely underscores the real and limited purpose of the "citizenship clause" in Section 1-- was also included in the amendment:

Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

A GREAT DEAL MORE COULD BE SAID about the 14th Amendment overall. If I ever am able to be done with my advocacy for truth regarding the income tax and can move on to finishing the analysis of the Constitution with which I have been noodling for a number of years now, I'll say it.

For now, though, suffice it to say that Section 1 of the amendment in no way mandates the granting of citizenship-- either union-state or United States-- to any child of foreign parents who happens to be born on American soil.

Even the construction of the amendment's "citizenship" clause by the US Supreme Court in United States v. Wong Kim Ark (169 US 649, 1898), which did (mistakenly) find its way to affirming a 14th Amendment-based citizenship-by-birth claim of a man born to Chinese national parents who were long-time legal residents in the United States, does not avail advocates of "birthright citizenship" for the children of non-resident (or illegal) aliens. In fact, Wong defeats the advocates' argument.

In that case, the court only found for Wong because of the status of those parents as being in the United States by permission, and under terms by which they were allegiant to the United States during their time in the country. It was during that period of allegiance and jurisdictional submission that their son was born.

The Wong majority, as part of the exhaustive explanation of its opinion, quotes Justice Joseph Story in Inglis v. Sailors' Snug Harbor (1833), 3 Pet. 99. There, Justice Story, referring to Calvin's Case, Blackstone's Commentaries, and Doe v. Jones, explains the basic principle from which the Wong court proceeds in finding that a child of legal residents can acquire citizenship by birth:

"Nothing is better settled at the common law than the doctrine that the children, even of aliens, born in a country while the parents are resident there under the protection of the government and owing a temporary allegiance thereto, are subjects by birth." 3 Pet. 164. (Emphasis added.)

The Wong court subsequently extends the legal residence distinction directly to its case at hand:

Chinese persons, born out of the United States, remaining subjects of the Emperor of China, and not having become citizens of the United States, are entitled to the protection of, and owe allegiance to, the United States so long as they are permitted by the United States to reside here, and are [thus] "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" in the same sense as all other aliens residing in the United States. Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886), 118 U.S. 356; Law Ow Bew v. United States 144 U.S. 47, 61, 62; Fong Yue Ting v. United States (1893), 149 U.S. 698, 724; Lem Moon Sing v. United States (1893), 158 U.S. 538, 547; Wong Wing v. United States (1896), 163 U.S. 228, 238. (Emphasis added.)

In the end this distinction is directly rested upon in the narrow ruling of the Wong court:

The evident intention, and the necessary effect, of the submission of this case to the decision of the court upon the facts agreed by the parties were to present for determination the single question stated at the beginning of this opinion, namely, whether a child born in the United States, of parent of Chinese descent, who, at the time of his birth, are subjects of the Emperor of China, but have a permanent domicil and residence in the United States, and are there carrying on business, and are not employed in any diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of China, becomes at the time of his birth a citizen of the United States. For the reasons above stated, this court is of opinion that the question must be answered in the affirmative.

United States v. Wong Kim Ark (169 US 649, 1898) (Emphasis added.)

Plainly, the children born to non-resident aliens are in no way beneficiaries of even the Wong court's expansive and mistaken construction of the 14th Amendment's "citizenship clause". Indeed, the express resort by the court to the legal residence of the parents in finding for Wong is the exclusion of all those not enjoying the same distinction of circumstance, and thus a left-handed ruling by the Supreme Court to the effect that the children of non-residents are not entitled to any such "birthright citizenship".

(It is also worth observing-- for the sake of good scholarship-- that while much in common and ancient law might have once weighed on the side of "birthright citizenship" on grounds outside the provisions of the 14th Amendment, the very adoption of that amendment with its explicit purposes and provisions on the subject has arguably now settled the question in the negative.)

AS NOTED IN THE PRECEDING ANALYSIS, the Wong Kim Ark ruling by the Supreme Court in 1898 which is relied-upon by advocates of the mistaken "birthright citizenship" as supporting their notions, is wrongly decided. The court in that case failed to recognize the distinction between United States and state citizenship that is the heart of the 14th Amendment provision in question-- perhaps due to poor briefing by the litigants in the case.

But even if Wong were soundly decided, it would not avail Harris in her claim, if indeed her parents were merely in America on student visas at the time of Harris' birth.

The Wong court reached its conclusions in Wong's favor based solely on the legal residency of Wong's parents, who were found by the court to have been "permitted by the United States to reside here" and to, in fact, have "permanent domicil and residence in the United States". The court reasoned that in seeking and establishing legal residency Wong's parents had affirmatively and deliberately relinquished their former allegiances and become allegiant to the USA, thus-- and only thus-- bringing them under the relevant provisions of the 14th Amendment.

If Harris's parents were in the country merely on visas at the time of her birth, as I understand to be the case, this would not meet the standard laid down by the Wong court.

"Resident" is a condition of specific legal meaning, as stated here, in Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1856:

RESIDENT, persons. A person coming into a place with intention to establish his domicil or permanent residence, and who in consequence actually remains there. Time is not so essential as the intent, executed by making or beginning an actual establishment, though it be abandoned in a longer, or shorter period. See 6 Hall's Law Journ. 68; 3 Hagg. Eccl. R. 373; 20 John. 211 2 Pet. Ad. R. 450; 2 Scamm. R. 377.

Obtaining or being in the country by virtue of a student visa is merely visiting on a deliberately and declared temporary basis, and not for purposes of, or with permission to, establish permanent residency. Entry into a country on a student visa involves no relinquishment of prior national allegiance and replacement of it with allegiance to the USA either affirmatively and deliberately or even casually and by accident, and being here on such a visa does not constitute legal residence.

In fact, particular legal steps must be taken by student visa holders in order to convert their status to one with the potential for lawful residence of the sort on which the Wong court rested its decision. See this for some professional discussion of the subject.

In sum, even if it were correct overall in its finding of a "birthright citizenship" right on behalf of Wong Kim Ark (as it is), on its terms the Wong ruling offers nothing on behalf of Kamala Harris' claims. If the student visas thing is sound, Harris should be removed from office (and I suppose consideration should be given to examining Senate votes during the time she had been seated in that body against the possibility that the outcomes of some of the squeakers should be reversed...).

THE INDICTMENT AIMED AT SILENCING JULIAN ASSANGE and deterring others who might be tempted to themselves expose US criminal behavior which has been shielded by self-serving classification levels 18 charges nominally grounded in three statutes, 18 USC §§ 371, 793 and 1030, as follows:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. JULIAN PAUL ASSANGE, Defendant. Criminal No. 1:18-cr-111 (CMH)

Count 1: 18 U.S.C. § 793(g) Conspiracy To Receive National Defense Information

Counts 2-4: 18 U.S.C. § 793(b) and 2 Obtaining National Defense Information

Counts 5-8: 18 U.S.C. § 793(c) and 2 Obtaining National Defense Information

Counts 9-11: 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) and 2 Disclosure of National Defense Information

Counts 12-14: 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) and 2 Disclosure of National Defense Information

Counts 15-17: 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) Disclosure of National Defense Information

Count 18: 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1030 Conspiracy To Commit Computer Intrusion

SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT May 2019 Term — at Alexandria, Virginia (see the document here).

Let's begin by looking at some of the simple and obvious legal issues compromising the indictment. Jurisdiction, for example...

Here's what is actually a very significant admission by the government within the indictment, but which is meant to deceive:

Between in or about November 2009 and continuing until at least September 2011, in an offense begun and committed outside of the jurisdiction of any particular state or district of the United States, the defendant, JULIAN PAUL ASSANGE, who will be first brought to the Eastern District of Virginia, knowingly and unlawfully conspired with other co-conspirators, known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to commit the following offenses against the United States:

Indictment, Count 1(B), (and appearing in more-or-less the same form at the beginning of every count).

This language (which is included in every count) appears to admit that Assange was not within United States jurisdiction when doing what is said to be criminal in the indictment (which he was not). But it is really an attempt to conceal or keep from recognition the fact that whatever might be the imperial wet-dreams of swamp-creatures in DC, United States jurisdiction does not extend to the actions of folks in foreign countries, and US law makes no pretenses to the contrary.

The phrase "outside of the jurisdiction of any particular state or district of the United States" DOESN'T mean outside of US territorial jurisdiction. That phrase actually means "in one of a number of special places subject to US jurisdiction".

Assange was in none of those special places while allegedly doing the things with which he is charged. But the mendacious DoJ wants everyone to think it has charged him without regard to his location-- and think, therefore, that it has legal authority to do so-- in order to keep its fatal jurisdictional problem from being pointed out to the courts.

Look closely at the language of the statutes meant to be coyly invoked by the express nuances of that paragraph "B" of every count of the indictment, reproduced above:

The trial of all offenses begun or committed upon the high seas, or elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district, shall be in the district in which the offender, or any one of two or more joint offenders, is arrested or is first brought; but if such offender or offenders are not so arrested or brought into any district, an indictment or information may be filed in the district of the last known residence of the offender or of any one of two or more joint offenders, or if no such residence is known the indictment or information may be filed in the District of Columbia.

18 U.S. Code § 3238. Offenses not committed in any district

The trial for any offense involving a violation, begun or committed upon the high seas or elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district, of—

(1) section 793, 794, 798, or section 1030(a)(1) of this title;

(2) section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421); or

(3) section 4(b) or 4(c) of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 783(b) or (c));

may be in the District of Columbia or in any other district authorized by law.

18 U.S. Code § 3239. Optional venue for espionage and related offenses

These statutes are the sole legal basis for establishing the location of any trial of any offense not committed within a US state and district (pursuant to the provisions of Article III, sec. 2, cl. 3 and the Sixth Amendment of the US Constitution), and thus incorporate and illustrate the legal limits of United States jurisdiction.

The phrase "out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district" (emphasis added) gives away the truth. The inclusion of any particular in this language establishes that it is only within US geographical scope-- which extends to US-flagged vessels as well as US real estate-- that is contemplated as locations in which US cognizable crimes can be committed. That inclusion implies the class of "US territory", and implies the exclusion of non-US territory (as does simple common sense and the ancient doctrine that outside any country's territorial waters is outside any country's jurisdiction).

But we needn't rely on mere inference and logic. These limits are further acknowledged, illustrated and made more particular (and thus, more easily seen) elsewhere in 18 U.S.C., but a long ways away from §§ 3238 and 3239. We have to go all the way back to 18 U.S.C. § 7 to find the definition of "Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States", at which we are given the meaning of "upon the high seas or elsewhere outside of the jurisdiction of any particular State of district". Here is that clarifying language:

The term “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States”, as used in this title, includes:

(1) The high seas, any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, and any vessel belonging in whole or in part to the United States or any citizen thereof, or to any corporation created by or under the laws of the United States, or of any State, Territory, District, or possession thereof, when such vessel is within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State.

(2) Any vessel registered, licensed, or enrolled under the laws of the United States, and being on a voyage upon the waters of any of the Great Lakes, or any of the waters connecting them, or upon the Saint Lawrence River where the same constitutes the International Boundary Line.

(3) Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building.

(4) Any island, rock, or key containing deposits of guano, which may, at the discretion of the President, be considered as appertaining to the United States.

(5) Any aircraft belonging in whole or in part to the United States, or any citizen thereof, or to any corporation created by or under the laws of the United States, or any State, Territory, district, or possession thereof, while such aircraft is in flight over the high seas, or over any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State.

(6) Any vehicle used or designed for flight or navigation in space and on the registry of the United States pursuant to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, while that vehicle is in flight, which is from the moment when all external doors are closed on Earth following embarkation until the moment when one such door is opened on Earth for disembarkation or in the case of a forced landing, until the competent authorities take over the responsibility for the vehicle and for persons and property aboard.

(7) Any place outside the jurisdiction of any nation with respect to an offense by or against a national of the United States.

(8) To the extent permitted by international law, any foreign vessel during a voyage having a scheduled departure from or arrival in the United States with respect to an offense committed by or against a national of the United States.

(9) With respect to offenses committed by or against a national of the United States as that term is used in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act—

(A) the premises of United States diplomatic, consular, military or other United States Government missions or entities in foreign States, including the buildings, parts of buildings, and land appurtenant or ancillary thereto or used for purposes of those missions or entities, irrespective of ownership; and

(B) residences in foreign States and the land appurtenant or ancillary thereto, irrespective of ownership, used for purposes of those missions or entities or used by United States personnel assigned to those missions or entities.

18 U.S. Code § 7. Special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States defined

There's a reason 18 U.S.C. §§ 3238 and 3239-- again, plainly the ones being relied upon by the United States, as shown by the language of the indictment-- don't simply say, "The trial of all offenses begun or committed outside the United States shall be in the district...", which they surely would if meant to announce (or assert) universal jurisdiction. They don't say this because even the United States-- its lawyerly pretenses to the contrary notwithstanding-- does not presume to such "universal jurisdiction".

The simple legal fact is that even if everything alleged by the United States about Julian Assange is true, he did nothing for which he can be held criminally responsible by the United States.

WHILE WE'RE ON THE SUBJECT OF JURISDICTION, and before moving on to the particular problems with the criminal allegations, let's look as well at a somewhat more esoteric but nonetheless valid problem with the US indictment, which is nicely highlighted by this language in that instrument:

At no point was ASSANGE a citizen of the United States, nor did he hold a United States security clearance or otherwise have authorization to receive, possess, or communicate classified information.

Indictment, page 16, section H. United States Law To Protect Classified Information, ¶46

This admission raises the reciprocal point that at no point was Julian under any kind of particular or express legal duty in regard to the United States, its classification rules, or those persons or interests which might be affected by his acquisition or dissemination of the information at issue. At the same time, under the terms of the First Amendment Congress can make no law hampering his receipt, possession or communication of any kind of information, meaning Assange was also under no incidental or general legal duty.

Criminal (or even civil) culpability does not arise just because some state doesn't like what someone has done, or even just because what someone has done is claimed to have harmed the complaining state. The alleged malefactor must have breached a legal duty to the complaining state in order to have committed a legally-cognizable offense; and what's more, a known legal duty. Under the terms of the First Amendment, there can be no legal duty to abstain from receipt, possession or communication.

Leakers might be under such a duty, which is often actually formalized in a signed agreement, or attends the character of their office or job. They can be sued or prosecuted accordingly. Publishers-- or even hackers-- have no such relationship. See this for more on this point.

***

JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATIONS SUFFICE to eviscerate the United States extradition and indictment. So, I could say that my work here is done.

But this is a hugely important case, and those threatened by Julian's revelations have an endless capacity for corruption, being capable of arguing that black is white without a blush. So, let's also look at the specifics of the charges and how they also cannot apply to Julian Assange.

Counts 1-17 are all based in 18 U.S.C. § 793 ("Gathering, transmitting or losing defense information")-- specifically 793(b), (c), (d), (e) and (g). Counts 2-14 also invoke 18 U.S.C. § 2, under which it is held that those who aid, abet, counsel, command, induce or procure the commission of an offense against the United States is punishable as a principal.

However, the legal character of each of these subsections of 793 which are said to describe criminal behavior of Chelsea Manning (which behavior is suggested, inaccurately and in contradiction of the evidence, to have been committed at the instigation or assistance of Julian Assange) hinges on specifics laid out only in 793(a). The language of that section is omitted from the indictment, and for very good reason (well, for very BAD reason, really, but good from the standpoint of the jackals attacking Julian...).

See, for instance this language from Count 1(B) of the indictment:

Between in or about November 2009 and continuing until at least September 2011, in an offense begun and committed outside of the jurisdiction of any particular state or district of the United States, the defendant, JULIAN PAUL ASSANGE, who will be first brought to the Eastern District of Virginia, knowingly and unlawfully conspired with other co-conspirators, known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to commit the following offenses against the United States:

1. To obtain documents, writings, and notes connected with the national defense, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense—namely, detainee assessment briefs related to detainees who were held at Guantanamo Bay, US. State Department cables, and Iraq rules of engagement files classified up to the SECRET level—and with reason to believe that the information was to be used to the injury of the United States or the advantage of any foreign nation, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 793(b);

"To obtain documents, writings and notes connected with the national defense." Pretty wide-ranging language, right? It suggests that 18 U.S.C. § 793(B) criminalizes obtaining any and all documents, writings and notes connected with the national defense (without authorization or whatever), right?

Well, left off of this little offense description are the very important first five words of 793(b). Those words read: "Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid,"...

That "purpose aforesaid" refers to the particulars of 793(a), which establishes the real and very limited nature of the acts criminalized under 18 U.S.C. § 793. Here is 793(a):

(a) Whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation, goes upon, enters, flies over, or otherwise obtains information concerning any vessel, aircraft, work of defense, navy yard, naval station, submarine base, fueling station, fort, battery, torpedo station, dockyard, canal, railroad, arsenal, camp, factory, mine, telegraph, telephone, wireless, or signal station, building, office, research laboratory or station or other place connected with the national defense owned or constructed, or in progress of construction by the United States or under the control of the United States, or of any of its officers, departments, or agencies, or within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, or any place in which any vessel, aircraft, arms, munitions, or other materials or instruments for use in time of war are being made, prepared, repaired, stored, or are the subject of research or development, under any contract or agreement with the United States, or any department or agency thereof, or with any person on behalf of the United States, or otherwise on behalf of the United States, or any prohibited place so designated by the President by proclamation in time of war or in case of national emergency in which anything for the use of the Army, Navy, or Air Force is being prepared or constructed or stored, information as to which prohibited place the President has determined would be prejudicial to the national defense; or

18 U.S. Code § 793. Gathering, transmitting or losing defense information

That's a big chunk of legalese, but reading it through shows that what is being made criminal in 793 is an espionage effort, the purpose of which is securing information concerning United States war materiel development or production in order to inform or facilitate corresponding development or production by a foreign enemy, or information concerning United States war materiel development, production or storage for the purpose of physical sabotage or a bombing run by a foreign enemy.

Here is the complete language of 793(b) cited by the Assange indictment as the nature of the first charge:

(b) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, and with like intent or reason to believe, copies, takes, makes, or obtains, or attempts to copy, take, make, or obtain, any sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, document, writing, or note of anything connected with the national defense; or...

Does that language, in light of the "purpose aforesaid" spelled out in paragraph (a), actually sound like anything done by Chelsea Manning, or by extension, Julian Assange (even if you buy the "aided, abetted, counseled..." etc. allegation)? Manning didn't copy munitions locations or details of planned troop deployments, or shipyard blueprints. And he certainly didn't copy anything at all for the purpose of facilitating the destructive or competitively adversarial actions of any foreign enemy.

What Manning copied and dumped in Julian Assange's lap were records of past war crimes, evidence of lies continuously told to the American public, diplomatic double-dealing and so forth. Manning is a whistle-blower, not a spy. And the same goes for Julian Assange. 18 U.S.C. § 793(b) doesn't apply to either one of them.

18 U.S.C. § 793(c) IS OF THE SAME CHARACTER as is paragraph (b), and begins with the same reference to, and reliance upon, the purposes expressed in paragraph (a). (b) covers the copying aspect of (a)'s spying offense; (c) covers the "receiving" of such a copy, and like (b), doesn't apply to Manning or Assange.

18 U.S.C. § 793(d) shifts gears slightly. This provision is directed at those having lawful access to or possession of the same class of materials identified in (a), who, while having reason to believe it could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation (again, within the context created by paragraph (a)) furnish those materials to someone else who is not entitled to receive it-- in other words, a mole. Again, no relevance or application to Manning or Assange.

18 U.S.C. § 793(e) concerns those having UN-authorized possession, access, control, etc., of the same class of materials identified in (a), who, while having reason to believe it could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation (again, within the context created by paragraph (a)) furnish those materials to someone else who is not entitled to receive it or "willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it".

Again, no application to Manning or Assange, who had nothing to do with information relevant to war materiel development, production or storage, nor any reason to believe that what Manning copied and gave to Assange "could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation" in any sense other than a public relations injury or advantage by virtue of the exposure of criminally-concealed evidence of war crimes, torture, diplomatic duplicity and the systematic deceiving of the American people.

Finally, 18 U.S.C. § 793(g) provides that if two or more people conspire to violate any of the foregoing provisions of section 793, and any of them take steps to effectuate the crime, all are culpable. But, of course, as is now clear, neither Chelsea Manning nor Julian Assange violated any of these provisions (and Assange did nothing within United States jurisdiction in any event, let's not forget).

THE REMAINING COUNT of the indictment, Count 18, cites to 18 U.S.C. § 371 (a blanket conspiracy provision covering the commission of any offense against the United States) and 18 U.S.C. § 1030: "Fraud and related activity in connection with computers".

(In the actual text of the count, citation is also made to 18 U.S.C. § 641 for some reason-- that statute only concerns theft, embezzlement or conversion of something of value from the United States for financial gain. No such thing is even alleged within Count 18 or any other, so I think we can just chalk this up to DoJ incompetence. So much frothing at the mouth going on during the contrivance of this indictment that some foam got in someone's eyes and a mistake was made...)

What IS alleged in count 18 is a conspiracy (prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 371) to access a computer without authorization and with reason to believe that information so obtained "could be used to the injury of the United States and to the advantage of any foreign nation" and to communicate obtained information to persons not entitled to receive it-- by which is apparently meant, "the American people"-- (and willfully retain the same, etc.), all as prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1), the cyber-age addendum to § 793 (while also covering computer fraud, virus implantation and the like).

While more could be said about this one, it should suffice, at this point and in light of all the foregoing, to observe that no reason to believe that information so obtained "could be used to the injury of the United States and to the advantage of any foreign nation" within the relevant meaning of those expressions can be credibly alleged, and in any event, Julian Assange, who was not within United States jurisdiction at any time, cannot have committed any offense in this regard any more than he could have in any other regard, conspiracy included.